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Binary Log-Linear Learning with Stochastic Communication Links
Arjun Muralidharan, Yuan Yan and Yasamin Mostofi
Abstract— In this paper, we consider distributed decision-
making over stochastic communication links in multi-agent
systems. We show how to extend the current literature on
potential games with binary log-linear learning (which mainly
focuses on ideal communication links) to consider the impact
of stochastic communication channels. More specifically, we
derive conditions on the probability of link connectivity to
achieve a target probability for the set of potential maximizers
(in the stationary distribution). Furthermore, our toy example
demonstrates a transition phenomenon for achieving any target
probability for the set of potential maximizers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-cooperative game theory has recently emerged as
a powerful tool for the distributed control of multi-agent
systems [1]–[3]. By designing proper local utility functions
and learning algorithms that satisfy certain properties, desir-
able global behaviors can be achieved. Potential games [4]
are an important class of non-cooperative games and have
recently received considerable attention in the literature [5].
In potential games, the local utility function of the agents is
aligned with a potential function in order to achieve a global
objective through local decisions.
There are a number of learning algorithms that can guar-
antee the convergence to a Nash equilibrium for potential
games such as fictitious play [6] and joint strategy fictitious
play [7]. However, a Nash equilibrium may be a sub-
optimum outcome and not the potential maximizer. Log-
linear learning (first introduced in [8]), on the other hand, is a
learning mechanism that can guarantee convergence to the set
of potential maximizers. As a result, it has been the subject of
considerable research recently [9]. Binary log-linear learning
[9], [10] is a variant of log-linear learning which can further
handle constrained actions sets, i.e. scenarios where the
future actions of the players are limited based on their current
action (like in robotic networks).
While considerable progress has been made for distributed
decision making using potential games, ideal communication
links are often assumed. In other words, it is typically
assumed that an agent can hear from all the other agents that
will impact its utility function. In realistic communication en-
vironments with packet-dropping stochastic communication
links, this is simply not possible. For instance, Fig. 1 shows
an example of real channel measurements. We can see that
the channel exhibits a great degree of stochasticity due to the
shadowing and multipath fading components. Thus, it is the
goal of this paper to bring an understanding of the impact of
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stochastic packet-dropping communication links on potential
games with binary log-linear learning, where each link is
properly represented with an action-dependent probability
of connectivity. By extending [9], we derive conditions on
the temperature (defined in Section II-B) and probabilities
of connectivity to achieve a given target probability (in the
stationary distribution) for the set of potential maximizers
(Theorems 3 and 4). In Section III-B, in a toy example, we
further observe a transition behavior for achieving any target
probability.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
In this section, we first introduce some basic concepts and
properties of potential games. We then review the binary
log-linear learning algorithm and the theory of resistance
trees, which we use in our subsequent analysis. Finally, we
motivate the need for considering stochastic communication
links.
A. Potential Game (see [11] for more details)
A game G “ tI, tAiuiPI , tUiuiPIu is defined by its three
components:
1) I “ t1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , nu is the set of players/agents/robots;
2) Ai is the set of all the actions (choices) that agent i has.
Then, an action profile a “ pa1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , anq P A denotes
the collection of actions of all the agents, where A “
A1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆAn is the space of all action profiles;
3) Ui : AÑ R is the utility function of agent i.
One of the most important concepts in game theory is that
of a pure Nash equilibrium, which is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Pure Nash Equilibrium): Consider a game
G “ tI, tAiuiPI , tUiuiPIu. An action profile aNE is said
to be a pure Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if
Uipa
NEq ě Uipai, a
NE
´iq, @ ai P Ai and @ i P I, (1)
where a´i “ pa1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , ai´1, ai`1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , anq P A´i denotes
the action profile of all the agents except i and A´i “ A1ˆ
¨ ¨ ¨Ai´1 ˆAi`1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆAn.
As can be seen, a game has reached a pure Nash equilib-
rium if and only if no agent has the motivation to unilaterally
change its action. In this paper, we are interested in potential
games. Potential games can have broad applications in dis-
tributed multi-robot systems since they allow each robot to
make local decisions while a global objective (the potential
function) is optimized.
Definition 2 (Potential Games [4]): A game G “ tI,
tAiuiPI , tUiuiPIu is said to be a potential game with po-
tential function φ : AÑ R if
Uipa
1
i, a´iq ´ Uipai, a´iq “ φpa
1
i, a´iq ´ φpai, a´iq,
@ ai, a
1
i P Ai, @ a´i P A´i and @ i P I. (2)
As can be seen, a potential game requires a perfect
alignment between the potential function and the agents’
local utility functions. It is straightforward to confirm that
the action profile that maximizes the potential function is a
pure Nash equilibrium. Hence, a pure Nash equilibrium is
guaranteed to exist in potential games.
B. Binary Log-Linear Learning (see [9])
In several scenarios, the set of possible actions that an
agent can take is limited by its current action. For instance,
in multi-robot systems, the next possible position of an agent
is limited by its current position and velocity. Formally, we
refer to this limited set as an agent’s constrained action set
i.e., Aconsi paiq Ď Ai is agent i’s constrained action set where
ai is its current action.
Binary Log-linear learning (BLLL) is a variant of Log-
linear learning (as shown in [9]) which can handle con-
strained action sets. It is summarized as follows. At each
time step t, an agent i P I is chosen randomly (uniformly)
and is allowed to alter its action.1 All the other agents repeat
their previous actions, i.e. a´iptq “ a´ipt´1q. Agent i then
plays according to the following strategy:
p
aipt´1q
i ptq “
e
1
τ
Uipapt´1qq
e
1
τ
Uipapt´1qq ` e
1
τ
Uipaˆi,a´ipt´1qq
, (3)
paˆii ptq “
e
1
τ
Uipaˆi,a´ipt´1qq
e
1
τ
Uipapt´1qq ` e
1
τ
Uipaˆi,a´ipt´1qq
, (4)
where aˆi is an action that is chosen uniformly from the
constrained action set Aconsi paipt ´ 1qq, p
aipt´1q
i ptq is the
probability of repeating its previous action, paˆii ptq is the prob-
ability of selecting action aˆi, and τ ą 0 is the temperature.
Moreover, the constrained action sets should possess the
following two properties:
Definition 3 (Reachability): For all i P I and any action
pair a0i , ami P Ai, there exists a sequence of actions a0i Ñ
a1i Ñ ¨ ¨ ¨ Ñ a
m´1
i Ñ a
m
i satisfying aki P Aconsi pa
k´1
i q,
@ k P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,mu.
Definition 4 (Reversibility): For all i P I and any action
pair a0i , a1i P Ai, if a1i P Aconsi pa0i q, then we have a0i P
Aconsi pa
1
i q.
Note that Definition 3 implies that any action profile in A
can be reached in finite time steps. Definition 4 means that
each agent can go back to its previous action.
Theorem 1: (see [9]) Consider a potential game with
constrained action sets that satisfy the reachability and re-
versibility properties. BLLL ensures that the support of the
stationary distribution is the set of potential maximizers, as
τ Ñ 0.
1Note that the selection does not require coordination among the nodes
and can be achieved through each agent using a Poisson clock [12].
We next introduce the concept of an asynchronous best
reply process over constrained action sets, which is a process
where each agent locally improves its own utility function
when it is its turn to alter its action.
Definition 5: An asynchronous best reply process over
constrained action sets is defined as follows. At each
time t ą 0, an agent i is randomly chosen (uniformly)
and allowed to alter its action. All other agents repeat
their current action, i.e. a´iptq “ a´ipt ´ 1q. Agent i
then selects an action aˆi uniformly from its constrained
action set, i.e. aˆi „ unifpAconsi paipt ´ 1qqq. It then
plays the action which maximizes its utility function:
aiptq P
 
ai P taˆi, aipt´ 1qu : Uipai, a´ipt ´ 1qq “
max tUipapt´ 1qq, Uipaˆi, a´ipt´ 1qqu
(
.
The best reply process does not necessarily maximize the
overall potential function of the game as it may result in
a suboptimal Nash equilibrium. When τ “ 0, the BLLL
algorithm boils down to an asynchronous best reply process
on the constrained action sets. A τ ą 0 then allows each
agent to occasionally select locally suboptimal moves, i.e.
it selects an action that decreases its local utility with a
non-zero probability. These occasional suboptimal moves
are useful as they prevent the agents from converging to a
suboptimal Nash equilibrium. The BLLL algorithm can then
be thought of as a perturbation of the asynchronous best reply
process, where the size of the perturbation is controlled by
the temperature τ . This idea is formalized in Section II-C.2.
C. Resistance Trees
In this part, we briefly review the concept of resistance
trees, which we will use in our subsequent sections. We refer
the readers to [13] for a detailed discussion.
1) Resistance Trees: Let P 0 be a stationary Markov chain
defined on a state space X . We call this the unperturbed
process. The process P ǫ is then called a regular perturbed
Markov process if it satisfies the following conditions:
1) P ǫ is aperiodic and irreducible;
2) limǫÑ0 P ǫpx Ñ yq “ P 0px Ñ yq, @ x, y P X , where
P ǫpx Ñ yq and P 0px Ñ yq denote the transition
probabilities from state x to y of processes P ǫ and
P 0 respectively;
3) if P ǫpx Ñ yq ą 0, for some ǫ ą 0, then there
exists some Rpx Ñ yq ě 0, such that 0 ă
limǫÑ0ǫ
´RpxÑyqP ǫpx Ñ yq ă 8, where we refer to
RpxÑ yq as the resistance of the transition from state
x to y.
Construct a tree T with |X | vertices, one for each state,
rooted at some vertex z, such that there exists a unique
directed path to z from every other vertex. The weight of
a directed edge from vertex x to y is given by the resistance
Rpx Ñ yq. Such a tree is called a resistance tree whose
resistance is given by the sum of the |X | ´ 1 edges that
compose it. Since P ǫ is aperiodic and irreducible (the first
condition of the regular perturbed Markov process), there
exists a unique stationary distribution µǫ for a given ǫ.
Define pǫz “
ř
TPTz
ś
rx,ysPT P
ǫpx Ñ yq, where rx, ys is
the directed edge from vertex x to y and Tz denotes the set
of all the trees that are rooted at z. Then, we have
µǫz “
pǫzř
z1PX p
ǫ
z1
, (5)
where µǫz denotes the probability of state z in the stationary
distribution.
The stochastic potential of state z is then defined as the
minimum resistance among all the trees that are rooted at z:
γpzq “ min
TPTz
ÿ
rx,ysPT
RpxÑ yq, (6)
Theorem 2: (see [13]) Let P ǫ be a regular perturbed
Markov process of P 0 and µǫ be its unique stationary
distribution. Then
1) limǫÑ0 µǫ “ µ0 exists,2 where µ0 is a stationary
distribution of P 0;
2) We have µ0x ą 0 iff γpxq ď γpyq, @ y P X , where
µ0x denotes the probability of state x in the stationary
distribution µ0.
Theorem 2 shows that the stochastically stable states (the
support of the stationary distribution µ0) are the states with
the minimum stochastic potential, i.e. µ0x ą 0 if and only if
x minimizes γpxq.
Informally, resistance (of a transition) is a measure of how
difficult that transition is. The greater the resistance, the more
difficult (less likely) the transition. So the resistance of a
tree rooted at state x is a measure of how difficult it is
for other states to transit to x. Thus, a state with minimum
stochastic potential is a state to which it is the easiest to
get to (informally speaking) as compared to other states. We
will utilize this metaphor of difficulty in Section III-B when
explaining some of our results.
2) BLLL as a Regular Perturbed Markov process: BLLL
algorithm induces a regular perturbed Markov process with
the unperturbed process corresponding to the asynchronous
best reply process defined in Section II-B [9]. The probability
of a feasible transition a0 Ñ a1 “ pa1i , a0´iq (where agent i
alters its action and a0, a1 P A) is then given by
P ǫpa0 Ñ a1q “
1
n|Aconsi pa
0
i q|
ǫ´Uipa
1
i ,a
0
´iq
ǫ´Uipa
1
i
,a0´iq ` ǫ´Uipa
0
i
,a0´iq
,
(7)
where ǫ “ e´ 1τ . As shown in [9], the resistance of this
transition is as follows:
Rpa0 Ñ a1q “ Vipa
0, a1q ´ Uipa
1q, (8)
where Vipa0, a1q “ maxtUipa0q, Uipa1qu.
Based on the theory of resistance trees, it can be shown
that only the action profiles that maximize the potential
function have the minimum stochastic potential [13]. This
in turn means that the stochastically stable states of BLLL
are the set of potential maximizers, as also stated in Theorem
1.
2The perturbations effectively select one of the stationary distributions of
P 0.
D. Stochastic Communication Links
Most of the current research in the area of motion plan-
ning of multi-robot systems assumes over-simplified channel
models. For instance, it is common to assume perfect links
or links that are perfect within a certain radius. In reality,
however, communication links are best modelled stochasti-
cally. More specifically, the received channel to noise ratio
(CNR) is a multi-scale random process with three major
components: distance-dependent path loss, shadowing and
multipath fading [14]. See Fig. 1 for a real example.
In the current literature on potential games, it is assumed
that each agent is connected to all the other agents that can
impact its next step utility function for all the possible actions
in its constrained set. If the wireless channel is modeled as
a disk with a known radius, then this can be achieved by
properly designing the constrained action set. However, in the
case of realistic communication links, this is simply not the
case. More specifically, it is not possible for every agent to
truly evaluate its utility function as other agents with whom
it cannot communicate may be influencing it. Thus, realistic
communication links have a considerable implication for
distributed decision making using potential games. It is the
goal of this paper to bring an understanding of their impact
on BLLL and derive sufficient conditions (on link quality
and temperature) to guarantee a target probability for the set
of potential maximizers (in the stationary distribution) in the
presence of stochastic links.
0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
−65
−60
−55
−50
−45
−40
−35
−30
log10(d) (dB)
Re
ce
ive
d p
ow
er
 (d
Bm
)
 
 
small−scale fading
shadowing
path loss
Fig. 1. Underlying dynamics of the received signal power across an indoor
route [15].
III. IMPACT OF STOCHASTIC COMMUNICATION LINKS
ON BINARY LOG-LINEAR LEARNING
In this section, we characterize the impact of imperfect
communication on the outcome of the BLLL algorithm. We
first prove that given any arbitrarily-high probability of the
set of potential maximizers, there exist a connectivity prob-
ability and temperature τ that can achieve it. We then give
an illustrative example to provide a deeper understanding of
our results.
A. BLLL with Stochastic Communication Links
Consider the case where the communication graph among
the agents is given by an undirected random graph Cpaq “
pI, Epaqq, where Epaq denotes the set of edges, i.e. the
communication links among the agents. Then, the probability
of having a link (probability of connectivity) between agents
i and j is given by pc,j,ipaq “ pc,i,jpaq “ pcpai, ajq, where
we take pc,i,ipaq “ 1, for all a P A and i P I.3 Note that we
have taken the probability of connectivity (and subsequently
the communication graph) to be action dependent to make
our analysis more general (which naturally implies a time-
varying graph). For instance, when the action of an agent
involves its position, then the probability of connectivity
becomes a function of the action profile. We assume that
the probability of connectivity of different links are inde-
pendent of each other in this paper. We further assume that
the communication graph is drawn independently in each
iteration.
As mentioned in Section II-B, in each iteration of the
BLLL algorithm, an agent is chosen randomly (uniformly)
to alter its action. Meanwhile, a realization of the com-
munication graph is drawn from the random graph Cpaq.
Let Ic,i be the corresponding realization of the set of
agents that agent i can communicate with. The probability
of realization Ic,i is given by pc,ipIc,i, aq “
ś
jRIc,i
p1 ´
pc,i,jpaqq
ś
jPIc,i
pc,i,jpaq. Note that Ic,i “ I corresponds to
the case where agent i can hear from all the other agents.
Also, since the probability of connectivity is state-dependent,
pc,ipIc,i, aq is also a function of a.
The agent then has to assess its local utility and determine
its action based on incomplete information. To represent this,
we extend the definition of the utility function Ui : A Ñ R
such that it is well defined for all Uipa|Ic,iq, @a P A,@Ic,i,
where Uipa|Ic,iq is the evaluated local utility function of
agent i given that it only communicates with agents in Ic,i.
One possibility for evaluating Uipa|Ic,iq is that the agent
ignores the impact of agents not in Ic,i. Another possible
strategy is for an agent to assume the last communicated
action for the agents it is unable to communicate with.4
In order to evaluate the impact of the stochastic com-
munication links on the learning dynamics, we start with
a temperature-dependent probability of connectivity of the
form pc,i,jpaq “ 1
1`ǫmi,jpaq
, @i, j P I, @a P A, where
mi,jpaq ą 0 is a constant. Based on our assumed form,
we always have pc,i,jpaq ą 0.5. Note that for pc,i,jpaq “
pc, @a P A, @i, j P I, pc need not have this temperature-
dependent form, as we will show in our result (Theorem 4).
The probability of the transition a0 Ñ a1 “ pa1i , a0´iq in
the presence of stochastic communication links can then be
characterized as follows:
P ǫc pa
0 Ñ a1q “
ÿ
Ic,i
pc,ipIc,i, a
0qP ǫc pa
0 Ñ a1|Ic,iq
“
1
n|Aconsi pa
0
i q|
ÿ
Ic,i
pc,ipIc,i, a
0qǫ´Uipa
1|Ic,iq
ǫ´Uipa
1|Ic,iq ` ǫ´Uipa
0|Ic,iq
“
1
n|Acons
i
pa0
i
q|
ÿ
Ic,i
ǫ
´Uipa
1|Ic,iq`
ř
jRIc,i
mi,jpa
0q
pǫ´Uipa
1|Ic,iq ` ǫ´Uipa
0|Ic,iqq
ś
jPIp1` ǫ
mi,jpa
0qq
.
3Notation not to be confused with pǫ
z
, which was used in (5).
4However, evaluating which is a better strategy becomes case dependent
and is an avenue for future work.
It can be seen that expressing the probability of connectivity
in this fashion ensures that BLLL in the presence of stochas-
tic communication links induces a regular perturbed Markov
process with the unperturbed process as the asynchronous
best reply process (Definition 5).
We can further show that the equation above can be
expressed as shown in (9) on top of the next page, which
results in the following expression for the resistance of this
transition:
Rcpa
0 Ñ a1q “ min
Ic,i
$&
%Rcpa0 Ñ a1|Ic,iq `
ÿ
jRIc,i
mi,jpa
0q
,.
- ,
(10)
where Rcpa0 Ñ a1|Ic,iq “ Vipa0, a1|Ic,iq ´ Uipa1|Ic,iq and
Vipa
0, a1|Ic,iq “ maxtUipa
0|Ic,iq, Uipa
1|Ic,iqu. Note that
Rcpa
0 Ñ a1|Iq “ Rpa0 Ñ a1q, where Rpa0 Ñ a1q is the
resistance in case of perfect communication (see (8)).
It can be seen that imperfect communication affects the
transition probability from a0 Ñ a1, and as a result, affects
its resistance. This means that the stochastically stable states
may change. Hence, the outcome of the game may be
significantly different as compared to the case of perfect
communication.
Lemma 1: Consider a potential game where the agents
employ BLLL algorithm in the presence of stochastic com-
munication links. Furthermore, consider constrained action
sets that satisfy the reachability and reversibility properties.
The states with the minimum stochastic potential are the set
of potential maximizers if we have the following,
ÿ
jRIc,i
mi,jpa
0q ě Rpa0 Ñ a1q ´Rcpa
0 Ñ a1|Ic,iq, (11)
for every agent i P I, all Ic,i and all a0 Ñ a1 “ pa1i , a0´iq,
where Rpa0 Ñ a1q is the resistance for the case of perfect
communication (see (8)).
Proof: If the conditions in the lemma hold, then the
resistance of the transition from a0 to a1 “ pa1i , a0´iq, for
some agent i, becomes Rcpa0 Ñ a1q “ Rpa0 Ñ a1q.
Therefore, the resistances of the transitions do not change as
compared to the case of perfect communication. The proof
of the lemma then follows immediately from Lemma 5.2 and
Theorem 5.1 in [9].
Remark 1: A good choice of the constants
tmi,jpaqui,jPI, aPA, is such that they satisfy mi,jpaq ě
maxa0Ña1tRpa
0 Ñ a1qu. This has the advantage that there
are separate conditions for each mi,jpaq and that they are
not dependent on how communication failures affect the
game.
Remark 2: Lemma 1 provides sufficient conditions to
guarantee that the states with the minimum stochastic poten-
tial are still the set of potential maximizers. Equation (11)
can be more explicitly expressed as a function of connectivity
P ǫc pa
0 Ñ a1q “
1
n|Aconsi pa
0
i q|
ÿ
Ic,i
ǫ
Vipa
0,a1|Ic,iq´Uipa
1|Ic,iq`
ř
jRIc,i
mi,jpa
0q`
ǫVipa
0,a1|Ic,iq´Uipa1|Ic,iq ` ǫVipa0,a1|Ic,iq´Uipa0|Ic,iq
˘ś
jPI
`
1` ǫmi,jpa0q
˘ . (9)
as follows:ÿ
jRIc,i
mi,jpa
0q “
ÿ
jRIc,i
logǫpǫ
mi,jpa
0qq
“
ÿ
jRIc,i
logǫ
1´ pc,i,jpa
0q
pc,i,jpa0q
ě Rpa0 Ñ a1q ´Rcpa
0 Ñ a1|Ic,iq,
for all Ic,i and all a0 Ñ a1. We can see that logǫ
1´pc,i,jpaq
pc,i,jpaq
is an important parameter (always positive). Furthermore, if
Rcpa
0 Ñ a1|Ic,iq ě Rpa
0 Ñ a1q, then connectivity to agent
i is not important, since the condition is always satisfied.
The following theorem shows that we can find some τ ą 0
and pc,i,jpaq ă 1 to guarantee that the probability of the set
of potential maximizers in the stationary distribution is larger
than or equal to some required threshold.
Theorem 3: Consider a potential game where the agents
employ BLLL algorithm in the presence of stochastic com-
munication links. Furthermore, consider constrained action
sets that satisfy the reachability and reversibility properties.
For any given ptar ă 1, there exists a τth ą 0, such that the
probability of the set of potential maximizers in the stationary
distribution is larger than or equal to ptar, if 0 ă τ ď τth
and pc,i,jpaq “ 1
1`ǫmi,jpaq
, @a P A, @i, j P I, where
tmi,jpaqui,jPI, aPA are constants satisfying Lemma 1.
Proof: We construct temperature-dependent probabili-
ties of connectivity, as discussed in Section III-A, such that
the constants tmi,jpaqui,jPI, aPA satisfy Lemma 1. Then, we
have a regular perturbed Markov process, and the states with
the minimum stochastic potential are still the set of potential
maximizers.
From Theorem 2, we have µ0x “ limτÑ0 µǫx “ 0, @x R
A˚, where A˚ Ď A is the set of potential maximizers. Thus,
we know that, for any x R A˚, there exists a τx ą 0 such
that µǫx ď
1´ptar
|AzA˚| , if 0 ă τ ď τx. Hence, we haveÿ
aPA˚
µǫa “ 1´
ÿ
aRA˚
µǫa ě ptar,
if 0 ă τ ď τth “ minxRA˚ τx.
The following theorem shows that we can find a sufficient
lower bound on the probability of connectivity, to ensure that
the probability of the set of potential maximizers is larger
than or equal to some required threshold, for the special case
of probabilities of connectivity which are state independent
and equal for all links, i.e., pc,i,jpaq “ pc, @a P A, @i, j P I.
Theorem 4: Consider a potential game where the agents
employ BLLL algorithm in the presence of stochastic com-
munication links with probabilities of connectivity that are
state independent and equal for all links, i.e., pc,i,jpaq “
pc, @a P A, @i, j P I. Furthermore, consider constrained
action sets that satisfy the reachability and reversibility
properties. For any given ptar ă 1, there exists a pc,th ă 1,
such that the probability of the set of potential maximizers
in the stationary distribution is larger than or equal to ptar,
if pc ě pc,th, where τ “ ´m
lnp 1´pcpc q
, with m representing a
constant that satisfies Lemma 1.
Proof: We construct a temperature-dependent probabil-
ity of connectivity, as discussed in Section III-A, such that
the constant m satisfies Lemma 1, in order to establish a
pc,th. From Theorem 3, we know that there exists a τth ą 0,
such that probability of convergence to the set of potential
maximizers is larger than or equal to ptar, if 0 ă τ ď τth.
Consider pc ě pc,th “ 1
1`e
´m
τth
. Then, the temperature
associated with this probability of connectivity is τ “
´m
lnp 1´pcpc q
“ τth
ln
´
1´pc,th
pc,th
¯
lnp 1´pcpc q
ď τth. Thus, the probability of the
set of potential maximizers is larger than or equal to ptar, if
pc ě pc,th with τ “ ´m
lnp 1´pcpc q
.
Recall that the BLLL algorithm allows perturbations from
the asynchronous best reply process, so as to allow agents
to intentionally choose locally sub-optimum actions with a
small probability. However, in the imperfect communica-
tion case, the failure of communication links also causes
the agents to unintentionally make sub-optimum decisions.
Given some ptar, our given sufficient conditions then aim
to restrict how often the unintentional mistakes can be
made. One observation in the proof of Theorem 3 is that
in general, τth and pc,i,jpaq are decreasing and increasing
functions of ptar respectively, i.e. if higher ptar is required,
then smaller temperature and better connectivity are needed.
This is because when ptar is higher, then less perturbation
from the asynchronous best reply process is allowed. Hence,
the agents have to assess their local utilities more accurately,
which requires better connectivity.
Theorem 3 can be easily extended to the case of Log-
Linear Learning. We skip the details for brevity.
B. An illustrative example
In this part, we provide an example to have a better
understanding on the impact of imperfect communication and
the results of Theorem 3. Consider a 2-agent game where
the action sets of the players are given by A1 “ tT,Bu (top,
bottom) and A2 “ tL,Ru (left, right). The utility function
Ui : A “ A1 ˆA2 Ñ R is given by
U1 L R
T 1 3
B 3 1
U2 L R
T 1 2
B 4 1
This is a potential game with the following potential function
φ : AÑ R:
U1 U2 φ
a1 “ pB,Rq 1 1 1
a2 “ pT,Lq 1 1 2
a3 “ pT,Rq 3 2 3
a4 “ pB,Lq 3 4 4
For the case where the two nodes cannot communicate,
we take U1pa|t1uq “
"
3 if a1 “ T
1 if a1 “ B
and U2pa|t2uq “"
1 if a2 “ L
2 if a2 “ R
.
We next find the stochastic potential for each action
profile, i.e. the minimum resistance of the tree rooted at
each action profile, by using (6). For the case of perfect
communication, the (only) state with minimum stochastic
potential is a4. For the case of imperfect communication, we
consider the scenario where the probability of connectivity is
state-independent, i.e., pc “ pc,1,2 “ pc,2,1. Let m “ m1,2 “
m2,1 “ logǫ
1´pc
pc
. By constructing all the resistance trees
and minimizing (6), we find that a4 still has the minimum
stochastic potential if and only if m “ logǫ
1´pc
pc
ą 1.
From (11) in Lemma 1, our derived sufficient condition for
the probability of connectivity to guarantee that a4 still has
the minimum stochastic potential can be found as m “
logǫ
1´pc
pc
ě 3.
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Fig. 2. The color map corresponds to the probability of the potential
maximizer as a function of τ and pc. The blue line with empty circle markers
shows pc “ 1
1`e´3{τ
, while the black line with filled circle markers shows
pc “
1
1`e´1{τ
.
By evaluating (5), we calculate the stationary distribution
for the case of imperfect communication to see how the
probability of the potential maximizer (a4) changes as a
function of pc and τ , as shown in Fig. 2. The blue line
with empty circle markers in the figure represents the curve
pc “
1
1`e´3{τ
(m “ 3), while the black line with filled circle
markers represents pc “ 11`e´1{τ (m “ 1). It can be seen
that given any ptar, the required probability of the potential
maximizer can always be achieved by choosing a fixed
m ą 1 and finding some appropriate τ and pc. (Theorem
3 shows a sufficient condition for this, where m ě 3).
Informally, as discussed in Section II-C, this is because the
state with the minimum stochastic potential (in this case, the
potential maximizer a4) is the easiest to transit to. The curve
m “ 1, i.e., pc “ 11`e´1{τ could be thought of as a transition
curve, as curves above it can achieve any ptar, while those
below it cannot. This is due to the fact that above this curve
a4 is the only state with minimum stochastic potential, while,
on this curve, the states with minimum stochastic potential
are a4 and a3. On the other hand, below this curve, a3 is the
(only) state with minimum stochastic potential. Informally,
this means that the potential maximizer, a4, becomes more
difficult to transit to as compared to a3 when m ă 1. In
fact, for m ă 1, the probability of the potential maximizer
a4 becomes arbitrarily small as τ Ñ 0. Note that we have
plotted the y-axis only down to 0.88 for better visibility.
Also, note that a case of connectivity of 96%, for instance,
means that the packets are dropped 4% of the time, which
is a typical value for several scenarios [16].
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Fig. 3. Probability of potential maximizer (a4) as a function of temperature
for different values of log
ǫ
1´pc
pc
.
Fig. 3 and 4 better highlight the transition behavior. Fig.
3 shows the probability of the potential maximizer as a
function of the temperature, for various values of logǫ
1´pc
pc
(m). The transition behavior of the curve m “ logǫ 1´pcpc “ 1,
is clearly observed. Finally, Fig. 4 shows the probability of
the potential maximizer as a function of logǫ
1´pc
pc
for various
values of temperature τ . The transition point can clearly be
seen at logǫ
1´pc
pc
“ 1.
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Fig. 4. Probability of potential maximizer (a4) vs log
ǫ
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for different
temperatures.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered the problem of distributed
decision-making in multi-agent systems (via potential games)
with an emphasis on the impact of realistic communication
links. We showed how to extend the current literature on
potential games with binary log-linear learning to account for
stochastic communication channels. We derived conditions
on the probabilities of link connectivity and BLLL’s temper-
ature to achieve a target probability for the set of potential
maximizers. Furthermore, our toy example demonstrated a
transition phenomenon for achieving any target probability.
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